Over the past decade the Liberal Party of Canada has worked hard to foster the notion that its past prime ministers have together contributed to a coherent foreign policy tradition in Canada. Such a sentiment, however, ultimately fails to account for the marked differences in the foreign policies of several Liberal prime ministers, in particular that of Pierre Elliot Trudeau. The content of this paper will provide an overview of the Trudeau government's foreign policy during his fifteen years in power, with a particular focus on the policies which fell near the beginning and end of his prime ministerial career. After outlining Trudeau's background in foreign policy and the degree to which he fell within the any Liberal "tradition," the paper will analyze the departmental review that
scribed as unexceptional and incoherent.
The Liberal foreign policy tradition (as it is currently mythologized) derives primarily from the policies of Lester B. Pearson, both during his tenure as prime minister and in the decades prior when he worked as a senior diplomat the Department of External Affairs. Pearson's foreign policy positions were primarily characterized by the eras in which they originated. Following the end of the Second World War, Canada and the United States were virtually the only western states that emerged economically stronger than they were at the start of the conflict. This, coupled with the rapid deterioration of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the subsequent rise of a world divided along an East-West axis, allowed Canada to exert more influence in international affairs than what would normally be expected for a country of its size. Trudeau's earlier remarks of the need for Canada to foster a new "special role" related to its "special interests."
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Foreign Policy for Canadians continued Trudeau's earlier theme of Canadian foreign policy needing to ultimately benefit Canada and Canadians before it focused on the external circumstances of other states. To this end the white paper put forward three "basic national aids" which the government contended must be applied to all policy, whether domestic or foreign, before other factors could be taken into consideration: "that Canada will continue secure as an independent political entity; that Canada and all Canadians will enjoy enlarging prosperity in the widest possible sense; [and] that all Canadians will see in the life they have and the contribution they make to humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose." 8 In defining
"foreign policy in essence," the first of the white papers additionally claimed that Canada, like other states, must act according to how it perceives its aims and interests. External actives should be directly related to national policies pursued within Canada, and serve the same objectives. Diplomatic relations … have to be kept under review to ensure that they continue to serve Canada's objectives effectively. Those may change as both Canada and the world change. In essence, foreign policy is the result of the Gov-ernment's progressive definition and pursuit of national aims and interests in the international environment. It is the extension abroad of national policies.
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This final statement is revealing in several respects. First, it underscores that the Trudeau government did not view its foreign policy as being detached from its domestic policy; the former would ultimately follow the latter, and in some cases the two might be indistinguishable. Second, the relationship between foreign and domestic policy was by no means equal, with foreign policy, at least for Trudeau, always playing a subordinate role to his domestic priorities.
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Apart from defining the government's general approach to foreign policy, the white papers included several other key insights regarding the importance Trudeau placed on multilateral forums such as the United Nations and NATO. Although the second white paper acknowledged the advantage which large organizations such as the UN had in contributing to international development, it also emphasized that a "number of difficult problems … continue to impede the ability of many of the international agencies to make the most effective use of It was during these final four years of his prime ministerial career that Trudeau's foreign policy began to seemingly readopt the "helpful fixer" role that defined the Pearson years.
Throughout this period, the constant theme which Trudeau returned to was one of peace and disarmament in the face of a renewed nuclear threat, a movement which he believed Canada was suited to lead. In his address to the Second Untied Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1982, Trudeau lectured that "the [United Nations] Charter is international law. In adopting it, each and every one of our countries has made it part of our national law. The Charter lays down, as a prime requisite of world order, that 'all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force' in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." 22 Over a year later, in a speech made at the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal, the prime minister similarly warned that "there is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground: an abdica-
